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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the lean versus clean debate by examining whether or not monetary policy in 
South Africa leans against the wind or cleans up after the bubble has bust. This is achieved by 
analysing the behaviour of asset prices during the different phases of monetary policy stance. The 
models that allow the behaviour of the asset prices to differ during periods of tight and easy monetary 
conditions as well as during periods of contractionary and expansionary monetary conditions are 
specified. The results provide evidence of an asymmetric behaviour between monetary policy interest 
rate and asset prices during the periods of easy and tight monetary conditions. The empirical results 
further provide evidence of symmetric behaviour between the monetary policy interest rate and asset 
prices during the periods of contractionary and expansionary monetary conditions. Thus monetary 
policy in South Africa supports the proposition of leaning against the wind as opposed to the 
proposition of cleaning up after the bubble has burst. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The lean versus clean debate has taken centre stage among policy makers in the aftermath of 
the recent financial crises. According to Issing (2011), the prevailing orthodoxy during the tranquil 
macroeconomic conditions before the 2008 global financial crisis, a period that is sometimes referred 
to as the great moderation, embraced the “clean up after the bubble has burst” principle, also known 
as benign neglect or the Jackson Hole consensus. In this period, the consensus amongst policy makers 
was that monetary policy should ignore fluctuations in asset prices and potential bubbles, at least to 
the extent that they do not affect the inflation outlook, and clean up after the bubble has burst to 
restore macroeconomic stability. The defence of this view, including empirical support, is provided by 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Greenspan (2002), Bernanke (2002, 2009), Gilchrist and Leahy 
(2002) and Svensson (2010, 2011, 2012), among others. The reasons advanced for ignoring asset 
price developments are that they are difficult to identify or measure in real time, that monetary policy 
is too blunt an instrument to deal with asset price bubbles without detrimental costs to the economy 
and that targeting asset prices would introduce moral hazard and indeterminacy of inflation.   
The recent global financial crisis has demonstrated that the consensus of benign neglect 
during the era of great moderation may no longer be valid as assert Gali and Gambertti (2013). It has 
strengthened the alternative viewpoint that central banks should “lean against the wind” which 
suggests that central banks should pay close attention and systematically react to asset price 
misalignments. According to Trichet (2005), leaning against the wind necessitates raising the 
monetary policy interest rate when asset price booms are identified and at times even beyond the level 
necessary to maintain price stability. Mishkin (2011) argues that the case for the leaning against the 
wind has become much stronger as opposed to benign neglect which is proposed by supporters of 
cleaning up after the bubble has burst. The defence of this view, including empirical support, is 
provided by Cecchetti et al. (2000, 2003), Borio and White (2004), Borio (2007, 2011, 2014), Taylor 
(2008), Trichet (2005, 2009), Curdia and Woodford (2009) and Woodford (2012) and Mishkin (2009, 
2011), among others. The arguments for leaning against the wind are that output gaps, natural rates of 
unemployment and interest rates are unobservable and are measured with great uncertainty, that 
inflation and output stability does not ensure financial stability given that financial crises can manifest 
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during periods of stable macroeconomic conditions and that unwinding financial crises can be 
unpredictable and costly.  
The proposition that monetary policy should lean against the wind suggested by Trichet 
(2005), Woodford (2012), and Borio (2014), among others, where monetary policy is tightened during 
asset price booms and loosened during the asset price bursts implies symmetric behaviour between the 
monetary policy interest rate and asset price misalignments. The reason for the symmetric relationship 
between the monetary policy interest rate and asset price misalignments is that the monetary 
authorities react by systematically raising the monetary policy interest rate to help restrain the build 
up of financial imbalances and by adopting an accommodatory monetary policy stance during periods 
of bursts in asset prices. According to Trichet (2005), by reacting more symmetrically, increasing the 
monetary policy interest rate during periods of booming asset prices and decreasing the monetary 
policy interest rate during periods of asset prices bursts, the monetary authorities discourage excessive 
risk taking and over investment during the periods of asset price booms, while the opposite is true 
during the periods of asset prices bursts. Thus when monetary policy leans against the wind, the 
monetary authorities monitor and react to asset price misalignments consistently and systematically in 
periods of both asset price booms and bursts. 
On the contrary, the proposition that monetary policy should clean up after the bubble has 
burst suggested by Greenspan (2002, 2010) and Yellen (2009), Bernanke (2009), among others, where 
monetary policy is restricted and passive to asset price misalignments during the build up phase of 
asset price bubbles and is loosened aggressively once the asset price bubble has burst implies 
asymmetric behaviour of monetary policy interest rates during the periods of asset price booms and 
bursts. The reason for the asymmetric relationship between the monetary policy interest rates and 
asset price misalignments is that the monetary authority ignores asset price misalignments during 
periods of booming asset prices and cleans up by reacting to asset price misalignments during the 
periods after the asset price bubble has burst.  Furthermore, the suggestion that monetary policy 
should clean up after the asset price bubbles have burst suggests threshold behaviour by monetary 
authorities with regard to asset price misalignments in that the monetary authorities react to asset price 
misalignments only in their burst phase while no attention is paid to the booming phase of the asset 
price misalignments. The principle of cleaning up after the bubble has burst, including empirical 
support, is provided by Borio and Lowe (2004), De Graeve (2008), Stiglitz (2009), Mishkin (2009) 
and Goodhart et al. (2009), among others. In particular, Mishkin (2009) argues that nonlinearity best 
describes the clean up principle in that a negative interest rate shock is likely to have a larger effect on 
asset prices than a positive one.   
This paper contributes to the lean versus clean debate by examining whether or not monetary 
policy in South Africa leans against the wind or cleans up after the bubble has bust. This is achieved 
by analysing the behaviour of asset prices during the different phases of monetary policy stance in 
South Africa. The asset price developments are captured using a composite indicator of financial 
distress that collects and synthesises information from the main segments of the South African 
financial market, including the bond and equity securities markets, the commodities market and the 
foreign exchange market. This indicator is constructed and described in detail in the next section. A 
similar indicator of financial distress has been constructed by Illing and Liu (2006), Balakrishnan et 
al. (2009), Cardarelli et al. (2009), Hakkio and Keeton (2009), Lo Duca and Peltonen (2011), Borio 
(2012) and Cevik et al. (2012), among others, while Kliesen et al. (2012) provides a survey of the 
similar indicator of financial distress.  
To capture the asymmetric behaviour by monetary authorities with regard to asset price 
misalignments, the models with various regime switching behaviours suggested by Terasvirta (1994, 
1998) and Van Dijk et al. (2002, 2003) are specified. These models allow for determination of the 
behaviour of the composite indicator of financial distress during periods of tight and easy monetary 
conditions, or the periods of high and low monetary policy interest rate, respectively. The models also 
allow for the determination of the behaviour of the composite indicator of financial distress during 
periods of contractionary and expansionary monetary conditions, or the periods of decreasing and 
increasing monetary policy interest rate, respectively. Consequently, this paper contributes to the 
clean versus clean debate by providing evidence of whether monetary policy in South Africa leans 
against the wind or cleans after the asset price bubbles have burst. 
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This paper is organised as follows. The next section is data description, followed by the 
specification of the empirical model. Then is the discussion of the empirical results and last is the 
conclusion. 
 
2.  Literature review 
 
The global financial crisis has demonstrated that asset prices play an important role in 
macroeconomic fluctuations hence there is notable resurgence in the literature on the role of asset 
price misalignments in macroeconomic fluctuations. Notable contributions include Edwards and Vegh 
(1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Bernanke et al. (1999), 
Gertler and Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), Christiano et al. (2010), Curdia and 
Woodford (2010, 2011) and Woodford (2012). This literature introduces financial fictions into the 
standard general equilibrium models. However, despite the significant advances in financial frictions 
literature, there is still no generally agreed framework to incorporate developments in financial 
markets into standard macroeconomic models. Additionally, Borio (2012) and Issing (2011), among 
others, contend that the literature on financial frictions mainly integrates individual financial market 
variables such as credit and house prices into standard macroeconomic models rather than a 
comprehensive measure that captures the financial market as a whole. In South Africa, the literature 
on financial fictions includes Liu and Seeiso (2012), while related contributions include Naraidoo and 
Raputsoane (2010), Kasai and Naraidoo (2012) as well as Naraidoo and Paya (2012) who find a 
statistically significant relationship between the monetary policy interest rate and the index of 
financial conditions in South Africa. 
Borio and White (2004) and Gali and Gambetti (2014) contend that financial imbalances 
cannot build up without some form of excessive monetary accommodation and hence argue that 
understanding how monetary policy reacts to asset prices is imperative. Thus the severity of the recent 
global financial crisis has rekindled the debate of whether monetary policy should lean against the 
wind or clean up after the bubble has burst. The literature on the lean versus clean debate includes 
Cecchetti et al. (2000, 2003), Borio and Lowe (2004), Cecchetti and Li (2008), Drehmann et al. 
(2012), Baxa et al. (2013), Gali (2013) as well as Gali and Gambetti (2014). In particular, Cecchetti et 
al. (2000, 2003) provide evidence that incorporating asset prices directly into central banks’ reaction 
function smoothens the path for output and inflation, while Borio and Lowe (2004) find an 
asymmetric response of monetary policy to the build up and unwinding of financial imbalances using 
data from 20 industrialised countries. Cecchetti and Li (2008) provide evidence that monetary policy 
at the Federal Reserve neutralises the procyclicality of bank capital requirements, while the opposite 
is true in Germany and Japan, while Baxa et al. (2013) find that central banks in developed economies 
asymmetrically decrease monetary policy rates during the periods of high financial distress. On the 
contrary, Gali (2013) and Gali and Gambetti (2014) provide evidence that the increase in stock prices 
is persistent following tightening of monetary policy conditions in the United States. 
 
3. Data description 
 
Monthly data spanning the period of January 2000 to December 2013 is used in estimation 
and it is sourced from the South African Reserve Bank database. The repurchase rate, also known as 
the repo rate, is the monetary policy rate in South Africa and it measures the nominal monetary policy 
interest rate. The indicator of financial distress is approximated using a composite measure that 
collects and synthesises information from the main segments of the South African financial market, 
including bond and equity securities markets, foreign exchange market as well as the money and 
commodity markets. The indicator of financial distress captures the interruption of the normal 
functioning of the financial markets. This interruption is characterised by increased uncertainty about 
the fundamental value of financial assets, increased information asymmetry and heightened aversion 
from holding risky and liquid assets resulting in liquidity shortages as well as significant shifts in 
asset prices. A similar indicator of financial distress has been constructed by Illing and Liu (2006), 
Balakrishnan et al. (2009), Cardarelli et al. (2009), Hakkio and Keeton (2009), Lo Duca and Peltonen 
(2011), Borio (2012) and Cevik et al. (2012), among others. Kliesen et al. (2012) provides a survey of 
the literature on indicators of financial distress and find that, although they are different in their 
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construction, the correlation between them is high given that each of the indexes measure the same 
thing in principle.  
The selection of the variables used to construct the indicator of financial distress relied 
heavily on existing literature and on their relevance and the availability of data. The variables and 
their descriptions are presented in Table 1. They comprise the interbank spread, Future spread, 
Sovereign bond spread, A rated bond spread, Corporate bond spread, stock market return, Financial 
sector return, Banking sector return, Financial sector beta, Banking sector beta, Nominal effective 
exchange rate return, Credit extension growth, Property market return, Commodity market return, Oil 
market return and VIX S&P500 volatility index. The financial distress variables were standardised 
and then aggregated using the principal components analysis weighting scheme. The standardisation 
involved demeaning all the variables by subtracting their means and then dividing them by their 
respective standard deviations. As such, a value of 1 in each one of these variables represents a 1 
standard deviation difference from their mean value over the sample period.  
 
Table 1. Financial distress indicator variables 
 
Variable Description 
Interbank spread  Spread between the 3 month Johannesburg Interbank Agreed Rate 
(JIBAR) rates and the 3 month Treasury bill rate 
Future spread Spread between the 3 month Forward Rate Agreements (FRAs) and 
the 3 month treasury bill rate 
Government bond spread   Spread between the yield on 3 year government bond and the yield on 10 year government bond 
A rated bond spread   Spread between the yield on A rated Eskom bond and the yield on 10 year government bond 
Corporate bond spread  Spread between the FTSE/JSE All Bond yield and the yield on 10 year government bond 
Stock market return   Annual change in the FTSE/JSE All Share stock market index 
Financial sector return   Annual change in the FTSE/JSE Financials stock market index 
Banking sector return   Annual change in the FTSE/JSE Banks stock market index 
Financial sector beta   CAPM beta of the one year rolling window of the annual FTSE/JSE 
Financials stock market index returns 
Banking sector beta   CAPM beta of the one year rolling window of the annual FTSE/JSE 
Banks stock market index returns 
Nominal eff. exchange rate return   Annual change in nominal effective exchange rate 
Credit extension growth   Annual change in total private credit extension 
Property market return   Annual change in the average price of all houses compiled by the 
ABSA bank 
Commodity market return   Annual change in the Economist’s commodity price index 
Oil market return   Annual change in the Brent crude oil price 
VIX S&P500   Chicago Board’s implied volatility of the S&P 500 index 
Notes: Own calculation with data from the South African Reserve Bank database. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the evolutions of the repurchase rate and the indicator of financial distress. 
The repurchase rate dropped somewhat at the beginning of 2001 but started to rise again later in the 
same year reaching a peak in late 2002. It then dropped dramatically from early 2003 reaching a low 
in early 2005. From early 2006, the repurchase rate increased steadily and peaked in the middle 2008 
before it dropped again dramatically to late 2010 where it remained range bound to the end of the 
sample. The movements in the composite indicator of financial distress is comparable to those 
constructed in the literature by Illing and Liu (2006), Balakrishnan et al. (2009), Cardarelli et al. 
(2009), Hakkio and Keeton (2009), Lo Duca and Peltonen (2011), Borio (2012) and Cevik et al. 
(2012), among others. The only notable exception is that the indicators of financial distress for 
developed countries show relatively heightened financial distress that peak in late 2011 as a result of 
the sovereign debt crisis. This observation is supported by Kliesen et al. (2012) who survey the 
literature on financial stress indexes by comparing the datasets from which they are constructed and 
provide evidence that these indexes are highly correlated since they approximate a similar principle. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of the main variables 
 
  
(i) Repurchase rate (ii) Financial distress indicator 
  
Notes: Own calculation with data from the South African Reserve Bank database. 
 
The movements in repurchase rate are closely mirrored by the movements in the indicator of 
financial distress where there are two distinct peaks in the indicator of financial distress in 2003 and 
2008. The 2003 peak in the indicator of financial distress is associated with the sustained increase in 
financial distress since 2000 following the tech bubble, the Enron scandals, the rand rapid 
depreciation and the 9/11 attacks in 2001. These events were followed by the war on terror and the 
South American economic crisis in 2002 as well as the market jitters as a result of the war in Iraq in 
2003. The 2008 peak in the indicator of financial distress is preceded by the sustained increase in this 
indicator from 2006 as a result of turn in US’s housing market that resulted in chain of events that 
exposed fragilities in the financial system resulting in the subprime crisis in late 2007. These events 
were followed by the subsequent dramatic fall in the indicator from late 2008 as mortgage companies 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as the world biggest banks Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers 
filed for bankruptcy, resulting in the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
The indicator of financial distress then remained range bound to the end of the sample. Table 2 shows 
the descriptive statistics of the repurchase rate and the indicator of financial distress. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the main variables 
 
  Financial distress indicator Repurchase rate 
 Mean 0.000000 8.266671 
 Maximum 8.331240 13.500000 
 Minimum -4.284230 5.000000 
 Std. Dev. 2.163317 2.677406 
 Skewness 1.041061 0.449726 
 Kurtosis 4.500744 1.837512 
 Jarque-Bera 49.405960 16.202940 
 Probability 0.000000 0.000303 
Notes: Own calculation with data from the South African Reserve Bank database. 
 
4. Empirical model 
 
Many macroeconomic variables tend to behave differently during the periods of expansions 
and upturns as opposed to the periods of contractions and downturns. The evidence of this salient 
behaviour of macroeconomic variables is provided by Sims and Zha (2004), Davig (2004), Hamilton 
(2005), Hamilton (2008) and Borio (2012) who observe that the expansions and upturns in many 
macroeconomic variables are normally gradual and protracted and are often followed by abrupt and 
dramatic contractions and downturns. The variants of the Logistic smooth transition autoregressive 
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(LSTAR) model are used to capture the behaviour of the indicator of financial distress during the 
different monetary policy regimes. The LSTAR model was proposed by Terasvirta (1994,1998) and 
Van Dijk et al. (2002, 2003) and is specified as follows 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1
... 1 , , + ,   
... , , + ,   
L L t d Lm t t tt m d
t
H H t d Hm t t tt m d
Y Y G Z Z
Y
Y Y G Z Z
β β β γ θ ε θ
β β β γ θ ε θ
− − −
− − −
 + + + − ≤= 
+ + + <
     (1) 
where 
( )( ) 1( , , ) 1 expt tG P Z Zγ θ γ θ
−
= = + − −         (2) 
and  
( )1 2 1 1...t t t m t m dZ X X Xφ φ φ− − −= + + +         (3) 
tY   is the regime switching variable, tX  is the transition or threshold variable, while ( )G   is the 
monotonic transition function that is bounded between 0 and 1, specified as a logistic function with a 
threshold variable, tZ  is the threshold variable, γ  is the smoothing parameter that determines the 
speed and smoothness of transition between regimes and  measures the threshold location. β  are 
the model parameters, while the threshold parameters are φ . m  is the embedding dimension, d  is the 
time delay and the ‘low’ and ‘high’ regimes are L  and H , respectively.   
More specifically, the LSTAR model is specified as follows in this instance 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1
... 1 , , + ,   
... , , + ,   
L L t d Lm t t tt m d
t
H H t d Hm t t tt m d
FDI FDI G Z Z
FDI
FDI FDI G Z Z
β β β γ θ ε θ
β β β γ θ ε θ
− − −
− − −
 + + + − ≤
= 
 + + + <
    (4) 
 
where 
 
( )( ) 1( , , ) 1 expt tG P Z Zγ θ γ θ
−
= = + − −         (5) 
 
and  
 
( )
( )
1 2 1 1
1 2 1 1
...
...
t t m t m d
t
t t m t m d
RPR RPR RPR
Z
RPR RPR RPR
φ φ φ
φ φ φ
− − −
− − −
+ + +

= 
 ∆ + ∆ + + ∆
      (6) 
 
tFDI   is the indicator of financial distress, which is the regime switching variable. G  is the 
monotonic logistic transition function with a threshold or threshold variable tZ  and is bounded 
between 0 and 1. tRPR  and tRPR∆  are the repurchase rate and the change in the repurchase rate, 
respectively. The different types of regime switching behaviours can be specified depending on how 
the logistic function ( ), ,tG Z γ θ  is specified. As such, the LSTAR model can take different forms. In 
θ
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the event that the transition variable is in levels t t dZ X −= , the model distinguishes between periods 
of high and low levels in the transition variable. Enders and Granger (1998) also suggest that the 
model can distinguish between periods of upturns and downturns in the transition variable when the 
transition variable is first differences t t dZ X −= ∆  hence the model behaves differently when the 
transition variable is increasing and when it is decreasing.  
In this particular instance, the model distinguishes between the periods of tight and easy 
monetary policy conditions when the transition variable is specified as  
 
( )( ) 11 exp tG RPRγ θ
−
= + − −          (7) 
 
The tight monetary policy stance describes the periods of high interest rates and easy monetary policy 
stance describe the periods of low interest rates. The transition variable in this instance is the level of 
the repurchase rate tRPR . This model is referred to as the model with tRPR  transition variable 
hereafter. The model also distinguishes between contractionary and expansionary phases of monetary 
policy when the transition function is specified as 
 
 ( )( ) 11 exp tG RPRγ θ
−
= + − ∆ −          (8) 
 
The contractionary and expansionary phases of monetary policy describe the periods of increasing and 
decreasing interest rates, respectively. The transition variable in this instance is the change in the 
repurchase rate tRPR∆ . This model is referred to as the model with tRPR∆  transition variable 
hereafter. Thus the study will establish how the indicator of financial distress behaves during the 
periods of high and low monetary policy interest rate as well as during the periods of increasing and 
decreasing monetary policy interest rate. For a more detailed discussion on specification and the 
various forms of Threshold Autoregressive models, see Terasvirta (1994,1998), van Dijk et al. (2002, 
2003). 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
The specified variants of the LSTAR model were estimated using the algorithm by Aznarte et 
al. (2013). The first step in estimation involved carrying out the linearity test of full order LSTAR 
model against full order autoregressive (AR) model at different values of the time delay parameter. 
According to Terasvirta (1994) and van Dijk and Terasvirta (2002), in the event that the null 
hypothesis of linearity is rejected, the next step involves performing additional tests to choose 
between the LSTAR model and the Exponential Smooth Transition Autoregressive (ESTAR) model. 
The choice between the LSTAR model and the ESTAR model can also be done as a post estimation 
exercise through the use of model evaluation criteria. The detailed steps to choose between the 
LSTAR model and the ESTAR model are detailed in Terasvirta (1994) and van Dijk and Terasvirta 
(2002). The results for the test of linearity of the full order AR model at different values of the time 
delay parameter are presented in Table 3. Linearity in the full order LSTAR model is rejected most 
significant when the time delay parameter is 2 for both the model with tRPR  transition variable, 
which distinguishes between periods of tight and the easy monetary policy, and the model with 
tRPR∆  transition variable, which distinguishes between periods of contractionary and the 
expansionary monetary policy.  
Additional tests to choose between the LSTAR model and the ESTAR model were not 
performed in this study given that the transition functions for the two models adjust differently to the 
deviations of the regime switching variable around the threshold level. The study aims to analyse how 
asset prices behave during the different phases of monetary policy stance. The logistic transition 
function adjusts asymmetrically, or at different speeds, above and below the threshold level. The 
exponential transition function adjusts symmetrically, or the same speed, above and below threshold 
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level. Therefore the transition function that adjusts asymmetrically above and below the threshold 
level is more appropriate. The estimation results also show statistically significant asymmetries in the 
behaviour of financial stress during the different phases of monetary policy stance, which favours the 
use of the LSTAR model as opposed to the ESTAR model.  
 
Table 3. Nonlinearity test and the optimal time delay parameter 
 
(i) Model with tRPR  
transition variable 
(ii) Model with tRPR∆  
transition variable 
 _Spec test  P Value−  _Spec test  P Value−  
1d =  5.39284 0.018952 0.10622 0.238072 
2d =   6.56306 0.008918 0.309752 0.182584 
3d =  6.34839 0.03472 0.267620 0.269037 
4d =  4.36960 0.112515 0.11019 0. 417264 
Notes:  _Spec test is the test for nonlinearity of the full order LSTAR model against full order AR model, which is the F-
test with associated p-values, under the null hypothesis of linearity. This test also doubles as the test for the optimal time 
delay parameter, 1,2,..,d n= ,  determined where the test for linearity is rejected most significantly. More details on 
conducting these tests can be found in Terasvirta (1994) and van Dijk and Terasvirta (2002). 
 
The empirical results and measures of model adequacy for the estimated variants of the 
LSTAR model are presented in Table 4. Given that the LSTAR model is specified in an 
autoregressive manner, this necessitates determining the lag order of the estimated models. The 
determination of the lag order involved using the Akaike information criterion, the Bayesian 
information criterion and the Hannan Quin information criterion. These criteria pointed to the lag 
order of 1. In addition, to assess the robustness of the estimated LSTAR models, the residual variance, 
the Akaike information criterion and the mean absolute percentage error, which is the forecasting 
accuracy measure, were implemented. The grid search, which involves estimating the model for a grid 
of diﬀerent values of the threshold variable and selecting the best ﬁt as the threshold estimate, was 
also implemented to determine the threshold values for both models. The Akaike information 
criterion, the mean absolute percentage error and the residual variance all point to the model with 
tRPR∆  transition variable as the preferred model.  
The null hypothesis of no remaining nonlinearity and parameter constancy are accepted for 
the model with tRPR  transition variable. However, this hypothesis is rejected for the model with 
tRPR∆  transition variable. In addition, the null hypothesis of parameter constancy is accepted for 
both models with tRPR  transition variable and tRPR∆ transition variable. The parameter that 
measures the speed and smoothness of transition between the low and high regimes in the transition 
variable is 10.59 for the model with tRPR  transition variable, while it is 23.85 for the model with 
tRPR∆  transition variable. This implies a relatively smooth and slow speed of adjustment for the 
model with tRPR  transition variable compared to the model with tRPR∆  transition variable between 
the high and the low regimes. The transition between regimes in the model with tRPR∆  transition 
variable is relatively abrupt given the relatively high parameter that measures the speed and 
smoothness of transition between the low and high regimes. The transition function for the model 
with tRPR∆  transition variable is statistically insignificant. However, it is important to note that the 
statistical significance of the transition functions is often not a concern and is seldom reported. Thus, 
the parameter measuring the speed and smoothness of transition is often allowed to be dimension free 
as suggested by Terasvirta (1994), given that its size points to the various forms of the transition 
function. 
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Table 4. Logistic smooth transition autoregressive model results 
 
 (i) Model with tRPR  
transition variable 
(ii) Model with tRPR  
transition variable 
 Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
Lβ  0.441991 0.119410*** -0.501185 0.183475*** 
1Lβ  1.064361 0.063335*** 0.933720 0.055681*** 
Hβ  -0.547978 0.241799** 0.880628 0.348681** 
1Hβ  -0.778892 0.117233*** -0.220190 0.108352 ** 
γ  10.589489 4.073608** 23.845582 27.78862 
 
θ  9.34830 0.062852*** 0.057952 0.078907 
AIC  96.00000  14.00000  
Mape  257.100  182.4000  
_Rsd Var  1.59400  0.864700  
_Rm Lin  9.581232 (0.325157) 2.106685 (0.00123) 
_Pr Cnst  2.9154589 (0.2755115) 5.812323 (0.447052) 
Notes: Statistical significance codes: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. AIC  is the Akaike Information criterion, Mape  is 
the mean absolute percentage error, _Rsd Var is the variance of the residuals, _Rm Lin  and _Pr Cnst  are the 
tests for no remaining nonlinearity and parameter constancy, respectively, with associated p-values in parentheses. More 
details on conducting these tests can be found in Terasvirta (1994) and van Dijk and Terasvirta (2002). 
 
The results of the model with tRPR  transition variable are reported in Table 3, panel (i). This 
model distinguishes between the periods of tight and easy monetary conditions. The grid search finds 
a statistically significant threshold at 9.34 percent. The statistical significance in this threshold level 
means that the indicator of financial distress behaves differently when the repurchase rate is above 
this threshold level as opposed to when it is below or equal to this threshold level. This means that the 
values of the repurchase rate above this threshold level describe tight monetary conditions, while the 
values of the repurchase rate below or equal to this threshold describe easy monetary conditions. The 
results further show that the indicator of financial distress increases by a statistically significant 1.06 
percent relative to its recent past during the periods of easy monetary conditions, while it decreases by 
a statistically significant 0.79 percent relative to its recent past during the periods of tight monetary 
conditions. This means that the indicator of financial distress increases at a relatively faster pace in 
periods of easy monetary conditions and decreases at a relatively slower pace in periods of tight 
monetary conditions. 
The results of the model with tRPR∆  transition variable are reported in Table 3, panel (ii). 
This model distinguishes between the periods of contractionary and expansionary monetary 
conditions. The grid search finds a threshold at 0.06 percent. This means that the values of the change 
in repurchase rate above this threshold describe tight monetary conditions, while the values of the 
change in the repurchase rate below or equal this threshold describe easy monetary conditions. 
However, this threshold is not statistically significant. The statistical insignificance in this threshold 
level means that there is no discernible difference in the behaviour of the indicator of financial 
distress when the repurchase rate is above this threshold level as opposed to when it is below or equal 
to this threshold level. The results further show that the indicator of financial distress increase by a 
statistically significant 0.93 percent relative to its recent past during the periods of contractionary 
monetary conditions, while it decreases by a statistically significant 0.22 percent relative to its recent 
past during the periods of expansionary monetary conditions. This result means that the indicator of 
financial distress increases at a marginally faster pace in periods of contractionary monetary 
conditions and decreases at a relatively slower pace in periods of expansionary monetary conditions. 
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In summary, the empirical results of the model with tRPR  transition variable have provided 
evidence that the indicator of financial distress decreases in periods of tight monetary conditions and 
increases in periods of easy monetary conditions. The positive growth in the indicator of financial 
distress during the periods of easy monetary conditions supports the view that accommodative 
monetary policy lays the foundation for financial crises to manifest as argue Borio and White (2004) 
and Taylor (2008), among others. The empirical results of the model with tRPR∆  transition variable 
have provided evidence that the indicator of financial distress increases in periods of contractionary 
monetary policy conditions and decreases in periods of expansionary monetary conditions. Of 
particular interest is the statistical insignificance of the threshold level in the results of the model with 
tRPR∆  transition variable, which is the model that distinguishes between the periods of 
contractionary and expansionary monetary conditions. The implication of this finding for the lean 
versus clean debate is that monetary policy in South Africa supports the proposition of leaning against 
the wind as opposed to cleaning up after the bubble has burst. This is contrary to the findings by Borio 
and Lowe (2004) and Baxa et al. (2013) who provide evidence of asymmetric response of monetary 
policy to the build-up and unwinding of financial imbalances in developed economies.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has contributed to the lean versus clean debate by examining whether or not 
monetary policy in South Africa leans against the wind or cleans up after the bubble has bust. The 
behaviour of asset prices were analysed over the different phases of monetary policy stance in South 
Africa. The asset price developments were captured using a composite indicator of financial distress 
that collects and synthesises information from the main segments of the South African financial 
market, including bond and equity securities markets, the commodities market and the foreign 
exchange market. The models with different regime switching that allow for the determination of the 
behaviour of asset prices during periods of tight and easy monetary conditions as well as during 
periods of contractionary and expansionary monetary conditions, were specified.  
The empirical results have provided evidence of asymmetric behaviour of asset prices 
misalignments in periods of tight and easy monetary conditions. In particular, the empirical results 
have shown that the indicator of financial distress decreases in periods of tight monetary conditions 
and increases in periods of easy monetary conditions. The empirical results further provide evidence 
of symmetric behaviour of asset price misalignments during periods of contractionary and 
expansionary monetary conditions. In particular, the indicator of financial distress increases in periods 
of contractionary monetary policy conditions and decreases in periods of expansionary monetary 
conditions. The results have also provided evidence of statistical insignificant threshold level in the 
model that distinguishes between the periods of contractionary and expansionary monetary 
conditions. The implications of the results for the lean versus clean debate is that monetary policy in 
south Africa supports the proposition of leaning against the wind as opposed to the proposition of 
cleaning up after the bubble has burst. 
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